How Asia developed its Space Industry
The inauguration of the African Space Agency (AfSA) on January 25, 2023 heralded a decades long push for a continental agency to direct space affairs within Africa. In this series, Kwaku Sumah examines the stated aims and goals of the agency, and asks, is it possible for the AfSA to achieve its stated aims as designed?
Read the previous Parts One, Two, Three
Read the next Part Five
On the face of it, Asia shares a lot of similarities with Africa. Asia has 48 countries to Africa’s 54, similarly boasts a high population (half of the global population) and is home to some of the world’s fastest growing economies. This makes it an interesting case study for Africa, as it shares similar issues and complexities.
Unlike Africa however, several of the most important high-tech players that supply electronics globally operate out of Asia, and Asian markets drive a lot of key technology trends that act as multipliers for the adoption of space-based applications, including IoT, Big Data, and Artificial Intelligence – given it a firm base for the rapid development of their space ecosystem. Taiwan is a key player in global chipset supply chains, Japan is an established technology supplier in the region, South Korea has the highest degree of smartphone penetration and highest robot density globally, India is the fastest growing major economy, and China has come to the forefront as a global powerhouse in manufacturing and now economically and politically.
In the space domain, China, India, and Japan are the established space powers each with different approaches. Each of these three countries have become internationally competitive actors, rivalling Western players. The dynamics in these space economies have in part followed the pattern laid out by the U.S., although driven by local strategic considerations. China, India, and Japan are also shifting the responsibility for space development from the government to the commercial sector, and are restructuring their agencies according to new mandates.[1] Unlike Africa, a continental agency has not manifested in Asia, where regional and bi-lateral co-operation remain the dominant form of collaboration.
1.1.1 China
After watching the Space Race between the U.S. and former Soviet Union, China began pursuing space travel on the back of military ambitions. Following an initial partnership with the Soviet Union to get access to rocket technology, China created the Ministry of Aerospace Industry to coordinate their space flight program, which eventually split to become the China National Space Administration (CNSA), the main space agency; and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), the main contractor for China’s space program.[2]
As with most aspects of China’s economy, China’s space industry is dominated by two State-owned Enterprises (SoE), CASC and the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation Limited (CASIC), which designs, develops, and manufactures spacecraft and launch vehicles. The few private space firms that operate, such as the China Great Wall Industry Corporation Limited, tend to be subsidiaries of the above.
“It is worth remembering that the lines between commercial and non-commercial companies are blurred in China – the main distinguishing factor being long-term strategic control of the economy by the state”
China's commercial space activities began with an attempt to enter the commercial launch market with the early Long March rockets developed by the CNSA. However, the U.S. Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, commonly known as the Cox Report put an end to those activities. The Cox Report accused China of espionage and theft through the launch of U.S. satellites on Chinese rockets.[3] Following this report, China’s commercial launch services to the U.S. and other western countries were banned, forcing China to expand into other international markets – eventually signing in-orbit delivery contracts for many emerging space nations such as Nigeria in 2004, paving the way for further cooperation, and the launch of NIGCOMSAT-1 for Nigeria in 2007.[4]
The real driver for the emergence of commercial space companies in China came only in 2014, with China relaxing the rules for private investment in the space sector in the document “The State Council's Guidelines on Investment and Financing Mechanism Encouraging Social Investment in Innovation and Key Areas”.[5] The commitment to building a commercial space ecosystem was reaffirmed as part of the National Development and Reform Commission’s 2015 “National Civil Space Infrastructure Medium-and Long-Term Development Plan of 2015-2025”, and then in turn with China’s “White Paper: China’s Space Activities”. The White Paper in particular signalled a policy transition from a state-centric model to an inclusive ecosystem that included private actors.
It is worth remembering at this point that the lines between commercial and non-commercial companies are blurred in China – the main distinguishing factor being long-term strategic control of the economy by the state. China will essentially help grow SoEs and private players alike but ultimately keep control over space infrastructure, frequency allocation, satellite operator licence, and launch permission.[6] One method employed to improve conditions for private players includes improving procurement processes for commercial products and services, modernising current service models, enabling more private capital towards the industry, and stimulating more public interest for space activities.[7]
China’s BeiDou Global Navigation Satellite System is an example of this strategy in effect. While initially developed by the CNSA, China has been proactively working to export BeiDou products and services (also in Africa[8]), and allowing private companies like Alibaba to provide services based on the BeiDou system.[9]
1.1.2 India
The Indian space program started with the military ambition to develop rockets following the launch of Sputnik 1. While some space research efforts existed prior to that, the Indian National Committee for Space Research (INCOSPAR) was set up in 1962 to guide rocket development efforts for upper atmospheric research. INCOSPAR was eventually superseded by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), institutionalising space research in India.[10] While India started its space journey with rockets, it’s main focus has been on using space technology to improve social and economic conditions for its population – a goal that Africa is now embarking on.
With the ISRO largely coordinating India’s space efforts, several state governments formed strategic partnerships with the ISRO to develop the mainstream use of domestic satellite remote sensing, satellite positioning, navigation, and timing data to support local activities.[11] As such, regional/state governments act mostly as end-users of space-based services established by ISRO. State governments come up with requirements for the use of space-based assets within their jurisdiction, which are then served by the ISRO.
Similar to most space agencies at the time, the ISRO initially managed both the public and private sector, with private sector engagement in space coming primarily as contractors for specific manufacturing activities required by the ISRO (similar to how NASA managed its affairs in the 1960s and 70s).[12] This set-up has largely stifled the growth of the private sector. Although India has seen the emergence of 500 firms that support the Indian space program,[13] they are largely unable to mature beyond their association with the ISRO, and unable to operate independently.[14]
Conscious of this, India released the draft of the Spacecom Policy, and the Space-based Remote Sensing Policy of India in 2020, with the aim of enabling the private sector to access markets for satellite communication and remote sensing products and services. Additionally, the creation of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe) also looks to provide support to the private space industry to conduct its activities.[15]
On April 6, 2023 the Indian Cabinet Committee on Security approved India’s space policy. The new space policy grants the private sector an active role in augmenting the development and competitiveness of the Indian space program, with the ISRO focusing on research and development of advanced space technologies, space exploration and other such non-commercial missions.
1.1.3 Japan
In a familiar refrain, the Japanese space program started in the mid-1950s with the development of rockets and the aim of launching a satellite. The Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS), and the National Space Development Agency of Japan (NASDA) were the first organisations created to this end, leading to the launch of the first Japanese satellite in 1970.[16] ISAS and NASDA eventually merged, along with the National Aerospace Laboratory of Japan (NAL) to form the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) which now coordinates the Japanese space ecosystem.
Japan has over 50 years of history in government-led space development, mainly focused on space science and research. They have primarily pursued space exploration, deep-space missions like Hayabusa, and human spaceflight missions. While JAXA is the centre of Japanese space efforts, a few large private organisations such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Mitsubishi Electric, and NEC are also involved in policy programmes, with the government representing their core business – although in recent years they have increasingly been serving foreign governments and the private sector.[17]
As Japan was initially trying to raise their technological level to that of the U.S. or former Soviet Union, little attention was paid to commercial space. JAXA drove the industry and government demand drove requirements at the cost of exploiting the commercial market. While Japan did achieve its goal of improving its technological capability, eventually participating in the ISS programme, ultimately its relevance in the global market was diminished, leading the Japanese government to change its space policy.[18]
The Basic Space Law,[19] adopted in 2008, emphasised that although the government was instrumental in developing space technologies, technology alone would not allow Japan to be internationally competitive. The Basic Space Law requested the government to encourage private business activities, through an anchor tenancy role, where it would procure goods and services systematically from private operators. New taxation and financial measures were also implemented to facilitate investment by private operators in the business.[20]
Since the enactment of the Basic Space Law of 2008, the Japanese government has conducted a major overhaul of its space activities with a combination of legal and policy instruments. The Space Activities Act, Remote Sensing Act, Space-New Economy Creation Network (S-Net), Space Industrial Vision 2030, and 4th Basic Plan for Space Policy embrace NewSpace, and establish policy and financial mechanisms to improve access-to-finance for private space companies, connect traditionally segregated stakeholders, de-emphasise the role of government in the industry, and facilitate access to satellite data with the aim of fostering the growth of space companies and technologies.
1.1.1 Regional and Continental Initiatives
Similar to the U.S. and EU, the Asian space superpowers are trying to shift their centralised models to enable the emergence of strong private sector ecosystems. In contrast to Europe however, Asian collaboration on a continental level has not emerged – with the space superpowers largely eschewing the creation of a continental space agency (and pooling of capital) to counter the U.S. (or other global space powers), and rather focusing on their domestic industries and growing their regional influence.
“Regional cooperation in Asia largely hinges on bilateral agreements between the three space superpowers, China, India and Japan.”
The Asian ecosystem is largely marked by competition. This competition is most visible in the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) realm, where Chinese, Indian and Japanese constellations vie for inclusion in electronics equipment. Although many applications are multi-GNSS by default, constellations compete for users. China in particular pursues an assertive space diplomacy strategy to maximise the global adoption of their system, sell satellite technology[21] or install ground stations.[22] Competition also occurs on a military/space security front with the pursuit and launch of ASATs – first conducted by China, and subsequently followed by India in a bid to match and deter Chinese capabilities – and in the maritime domain for enhanced territorial awareness.
As the premier space power in the region, China’s dominance drives much of the space competition in Asia. A fact that has led to greater cooperation in space exploration between India and Japan. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe committed to putting outer space at the centre of their bilateral relationship, and “welcomed the deepening of cooperation between the space agencies of the two countries in the field of earth observation, satellite based navigation, space sciences and lunar exploration”.[23]
Collaboration, however, remain favourable. Given their size and scale, (particularly in the case of China and India), Asian countries offer a sizeable data marketplace, which in turn confers huge business opportunities for satellite data providers, and NewSpace companies, that target the downstream segment. Additionally, given the strong academic/scientific capabilities, R&D experience, manufacturing and ICT sectors, and low costs of labour in the region, collaboration is ultimately mutually beneficial.
To that end, two cooperative initiatives have been formed, led by China and Japan. The Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), led by China, promotes collaborative space programs among Member States; while the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF), led by Japan, promotes the use of space technology for sustainable economic and social development as well as space-application cooperation. Both are however seen as tools for the two nations to accumulate power and influence over neighbouring states.[24]
Other initiatives such as the Asia-Pacific Multilateral Cooperation in Space Technology and Applications (AP-MCSTA), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Centre for Space Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific (CSSTEAP) have mixed roles and success.
These frameworks exist to provide a basis for cooperation on specific space projects, education and training in space technology and its applications, and a forum for discussion and regular meetings between Member States. The multiplicity of different initiatives however, highlights the complex competitive-cooperative dynamic of the Asian space ecosystem and the impact that China and Japan have on the region (as the primary opponents in the various regional initiatives, given their historical geopolitical rivalry). Integration or a fusion of the various regional initiatives is also unlikely, with the development of an Asian Space Agency still seen as improbable.[25]
There are some advantages of this fractured cooperative landscape, especially for developing states who can find themselves accepted by one particular framework or another, helping to reduce the disparity between space capable states and developing states. The coexistence of several cooperation initiatives in Asia basically reflects the political reality in this region. Civil space cooperation is not overshadowed by considerations of space security, but rather the pursuit of regional leadership between China and Japan, with India joining the club recently.[26]
Regional cooperation in Asia as a result largely hinges on bilateral agreements between the three space superpowers, China, India and Japan. With Africa also having a few space leaders in the different African regions, the competitive-cooperative dynamic in Asia could serve as an interesting model that could be pursued on the continent.
What can Africa learn from other regions? Part four covers learnings from the U.S. for Africa.
Kwaku Sumah
Kwaku is the founder of Spacehubs Africa, and has been active in the space industry since 2016, working as a consultant for European and African space institutions and companies. He has worked on projects across the entire space value chain, including analysis on downstream markets, space debris evolution, planetary defence, and the launch market; as well as an assessment of the European financing landscape and due diligence on space companies.
[1] European Space Policy Institute, “ESPI Report 77 – New Space in Asia – Full Report”, ISSN: 2218-0931 (print) 2076-6688 (online), February 2021.
[2]Carolyn Collins Petersen, “The History of the Chinese Program”, 3 May 2018, https://www.thoughtco.com/chinese-space-program-4164018.
[3] U.S. House of Representatives, "Appendices", Archived on 9 March 2014, https://archive.ph/20140309085607/http:/www.house.gov/coxreport/chapfs/app.html.
[4] Jin, Ju, “China’s Space Industry and International Collaboration. 3rd Space Exploration Conference & Exhibit”, 27 February 2008, https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/214655main_SpeceEx08-Slides_Jin_final.pdf
[5] European Space Policy Institute, “ESPI Report 77 – New Space in Asia – Full Report”, ISSN: 2218-0931 (print) 2076-6688 (online), February 2021.
[6] Xinhua News Agency, “Xi Focus: Xi stresses development of science, technology to meet significant national needs.” 12 September 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-09/12/c_139361891.htm.
[7]Blaine Curcio and Jacqueline Myrrhe. “China Space Day 2019 - A Retrospective.”, GoTaikonauts!, Issue no 25, June 2019, pp. 20- 23.
[8] Zhao Lei, “China and Africa will strengthen cooperation on Beidou satellite system”, 6 November 2021, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202111/06/WS618587cfa310cdd39bc73aa8.html.
[9] Inside GNSS, “Alibaba, China Military Supplier Join Forces for BeiDou-Aided LBS JV”, https://insidegnss.com/alibaba-china-miltary-supplier-join-forces-for-beidou-aided-lbs-jv/.
[10] Bhargava, Pushpa M.; Chakrabarti, Chandana, “The Saga of Indian Science Since Independence: In a Nutshell”, 2003, Universities Press. 39, ISBN 978-81-7371-435-1. Archived from the original on 13 May 2016.
[11] European Space Policy Institute, “ESPI Report 77 – New Space in Asia – Full Report”, ISSN: 2218-0931 (print) 2076-6688 (online), February 2021.
[12] Ibid.
[13] “ISRO Chairman K Sivan asserts that space sector reforms are not aimed at privatising the agency,” Business Insider. https://www.businessinsider.in/science/space/news/space-sector-reforms-not-aimed-at-privatising-isro-chairman-k-sivan/articleshow/77653759.cms
[14] European Space Policy Institute, “ESPI Report 77 – New Space in Asia – Full Report”, ISSN: 2218-0931 (print) 2076-6688 (online), February 2021.
[15] A. Sinha, “IN-SPACe explained: what it means to the future of space exploration,” The Indian Express, 28 June 2020. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/in-space-india-space-missions-private-participation-isro-6476532/.
[16] Institute of Space Research, “History of Japanese Space Development”, chapter 3, https://www.isas.jaxa.jp/j/japan_s_history/chapter03/03/03.shtml.
[17] European Space Policy Institute, “ESPI Report 77 – New Space in Asia – Full Report”, ISSN: 2218-0931 (print) 2076-6688 (online), February 2021.
[18] Ibid.
[19] JAXA, “Basic Space Law (Law No.43 of 2008)” https://stage.tksc.jaxa.jp/spacelaw/country/japan/27A-1.E.pdf.
[20] Ibid. Article 16.
[21] Pakistan, Laos and Belarus have been buying Chinese SatCom satellites.
[22] SatellitePro Me, “China opens first overseas Beidou satellite centre in Tunisia”, 18 April 2018, https://satelliteprome.com/news/china-opens-first-overseas-beidou-satellite-centre-in-tunisia/.
[23] India-Japan Joint Statement during visit of Prime Minister of Japan to India, “Toward a Free, Open and Prosperous Indo-Pacific”, 14 September 2017, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100002878.pdf.
[24] Asif A. Siddiqi. “An Asian space race, hype or reality?”, Roger Handberg, “China’s space strategy and policy evolution”, in Eligar Sadeh, editors, “Space strategy in the 21st century: theory and policy”, New York: Routledge; 2013, p. 259, Kazuto Suzuki, “The contest for leadership in East Asia: Japanese and Chinese approaches to outer space”, Space Policy, 2013; 29(2): pp. 99-106.
[25] Christoph Beischl, “Towards an Asian Space Agency? The whence and whither of Asian interstate relations in the space sector in the 21st century”, 2018, Doctoral thesis, University of London.
[26] Rong Du, “Space Cooperation in Asia: a Mystery”, IAC-14 E3.1.4, 2014, https://swfound.org/media/187608/rong_du_paper_iac_2014.pdf.